In one sentence Palliative care is specialised medical care that relieves the symptoms and stress of a serious illness and treats the total suffering of the patient and the family.
Palliative care treats the whole suffering, not only the disease
Palliative care is specialised medical care for a person living with a serious illness. Its first work is relief: it removes or eases the symptoms and the stress that the illness produces. But the notes insist that the body is not the whole story. The team also takes into account physical, psychological, social and spiritual suffering, so that what is treated is the total suffering of the person. The goal is to improve the quality of life of the patient and of the family, who carry the illness with him. This care follows the needs of the patient, so it is appropriate at any age and at any stage of a serious illness, and it can be given at the same time as treatment that aims at cure.
A man with advanced cancer still receives chemotherapy. He is breathless, frightened and cannot sleep. The palliative team adds treatment for the breathlessness, a plan for the night and a conversation about his fear. The chemotherapy continues; the suffering is treated at the same time.
Palliative care is not the opposite lane of a road that you enter only when curative treatment leaves it; it is a second lane opened alongside the first. The comparison stops there: unlike traffic lanes, the two can be used by the same patient at the same time and in changing proportions.
The family asks: does starting palliative care mean that you are giving up on him?
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No. Palliative care is based on the needs of the patient, is appropriate at any stage and can be provided along with curative treatment. It adds a layer of support for symptoms and stress; ending curative treatment is a separate decision, taken with the patient.
Read detailed explanations
- From the hospice to the concurrent model: how palliative care is organised and where it came from
A properly organised palliative service is a team before it is a place: the notes describe a specially trained group of doctors, nurses and other specialists who work with the patient’s other doctors to provide an extra layer of support, and the unit of care is the patient and the family together, because the illness is lived by both and the family carries the daily work. The modern form of this approach is usually traced to Cicely Saunders, who opened St Christopher’s Hospice in south London in 1967 and insisted that pain has physical, emotional, social and spiritual components that must be assessed separately. The World Health Organization adopted the term in 1990 and restated the definition in 2002: palliative care is an approach that improves the quality of life of patients and their families facing the problems associated with life-threatening illness, through the prevention and relief of suffering by means of early identification and impeccable assessment and treatment of pain and other problems, physical, psychosocial and spiritual. Two practical consequences follow. First, morphine and the other strong analgesics are legitimate medicines in this setting, and the fear of dependence must never be allowed to leave a dying person in pain. Second, the concurrent model — palliative input started at the diagnosis of a life-limiting illness and increased as the disease advances — is now the standard, because waiting for the failure of curative treatment leaves the patient and the family without support during the months when they need it most.
- The two texts and the three sources: why the duty binds even when nobody is watching
The duty is older than any hospital, and its wording has been argued over for twenty-four centuries. The Hippocratic Oath states: “What I may see or hear in the course of the treatment or even outside of the treatment in regard to the life of men, which on no account one must spread abroad, I will keep to myself holding such things shameful to be spoken about.” The Oath allows no exception. The World Medical Association, founded in 1947, took the opposite route in its International Code of Medical Ethics, adopted in London in 1949 and amended several times since: it is ethical to disclose confidential information when the patient consents to it or when there is a real and imminent threat of harm to the patient or to others and this threat can be only removed by a breach of confidentiality. The difference between the two texts is the difference between a vow and a rule with conditions, and your practice sits in the second. The notes then give the three sources of the high value placed on confidentiality, and they are not three synonyms. Autonomy: personal information about a person belongs to that person, and those who learn it through a test or a consultation are bound to keep it unless the person authorises disclosure. Respect for others: preserving privacy is one of the ways we show that a human being deserves respect, and because people differ in how much privacy they want, the professional must determine what this patient wants kept secret rather than assume that everyone wants what he himself would want. Trust: patients have to reveal intimate information to strangers in order to be treated, and they will withhold it if they have no reason to believe that it will be kept; that trust rests on the ethical and legal standards the profession is expected to uphold. The practical point of separating the three is that they fail differently. A breach of autonomy is a wrong done to the patient’s ownership of his own story; a breach of respect is an insult; a breach of trust dries up the information the next clinician needs, and damages patients who were never named in the file. The WMA Declaration on the Rights of the Patient, first adopted in Lisbon in 1981, adds the operational detail: identifiable information must be kept confidential even after death, disclosure to other health professionals is on a strictly need-to-know basis unless the patient consents, and human substances from which identifiable data can be derived must be protected in the same way as the record itself.
- What a breach costs, and where research stops being a reason
A breach of medical confidentiality exposes the professional to four distinct kinds of sanction, and beginners usually know only the first. Civil sanctions: a civil action in the tort of defamation may lie against a practitioner who, without authorisation or legal duty, divulges medical secrets to third parties; defamation is any statement, written or spoken, that lowers a person in the eyes of right-thinking members of the community, and if the patient proves that the statement was defamatory, that it referred to him and that it was made in public, the court may award financial compensation. Criminal sanctions: defamation is also an offence under section 305 of the Cameroon Penal Code, which punishes whoever destroys the reputation of another by imputations, direct or indirect, of facts he is unable to prove with imprisonment from six days to six months and a fine from 5,000 to 2,000,000 CFA francs, or with only one of those penalties; the section applies as well to defamation of the memory of a deceased person with intent to injure the honour or reputation of living heirs, spouse or universal legatee. Disciplinary sanctions: any professional who fails to comply with the Code of Ethics is subject to the Disciplinary Board constituted in accordance with the law, and a complaint against a doctor must first be investigated by that Board. Administrative sanctions: they fall on staff of public hospitals, where the hospital is vicariously liable for damage caused by its public officials, including doctors, interns, residents and students. As a civil servant the doctor is exposed to four groups of sanctions: the first group, written warning and blame with inscription on the documents; the second, delay in advancement for one year and lowering of one or two grades at most; the third, lowering of class and rank and temporary dismissal for not more than six months; the fourth, dismissal. The modes of breach are ordinary rather than dramatic: oral indiscretion in the corridor, publication in a scientific journal of details that identify the patient, photographs, voice recordings, and a file left within reach of visitors. Notice that publication is on that list, which is why the sentence about public interest, including research interests, cannot be read as a blanket authorisation. Three further rules keep the research question honest. Certificates are drawn up at the request of the interested parties and given to them; the doctor who issues the certificate is not bound to secrecy towards his own client, and disclosure of the certificate can come only from the patient. Statutory exceptions exist — declarations of death, declarations of contagious and epidemic diseases, and denunciations of certain crimes such as poisoning, abuse and assault on children, sequestration and criminal abortion — and each one names the authority that may receive the information. Finally, the premarital examination paragraph in the notes contains a duplication that must be corrected, because it lists sickle-cell anaemia and thalassaemia and then sickle-cell anaemia again: the standard pairing is haemoglobinopathies (sickle-cell disease and thalassaemia) plus infectious diseases (hepatitis B, hepatitis C and HIV/AIDS). The rule that follows matters more than the list: when the professional has been consulted by one of the fiancés, he must keep the secret, and there is no secret to keep only when the two agree to consult together and to communicate the findings before the marriage.